TongaRights Shape Visibility
Strong job quality meets weak legal rights, enforcement and parliamentary representation.
Tonga scores a GEVI of 52.0 (90% interval 47.7 to 56.5), in the Partial band. Work participation and job quality are close to parity, but Tonga has the weakest legal position for women in the series: its laws give women 39.8% of the legal rights afforded to men, and only 3.7% of parliamentary seats are held by women. All 13 inputs are measured (blind-spot ratio 0.00).
Source: the attached country paper. Animation reveals the reported measures; it does not show change over time.
Abstract
Tonga scores a GEVI of 52.0 (90% interval 47.7 to 56.5), in the Partial band. Work participation and job quality are close to parity, but Tonga has the weakest legal position for women in the series: its laws give women 39.8% of the legal rights afforded to men, and only 3.7% of parliamentary seats are held by women. All 13 inputs are measured (blind-spot ratio 0.00).
Enterprise and legal rights (D3 = 0.417) is the lowest in the series, and it is the dimension that drags the index. All three of its indicators are weak: 31.2% of firms have a woman among their owners, the law gives women 39.8% of the rights men have, and experts judge those rights enforced at 23% of their potential. Raising the legal score I8 from 0.398 to 0.60 would add 1.6 points, to 53.6; raising women's share of parliament from 3.7% to 15% would add 2.6 points, to 54.6.
The paper prioritises legal reform first, because it has the lowest starting point; build the enforcement record; add sex to business and tax registrations.
Tonga's binding constraint is legal and institutional, so its highest-value data product is the legal gap analysis, followed by a business register that records owner sex.
Download the paper PDFHeadline result
Strong job quality meets weak legal rights, enforcement and parliamentary representation.
90% interval 47.7–56.5.
Rank 5 of 15 · Blind-spot ratio 0.00.
versus D2 at 0.894
Tonga's binding constraint is legal and institutional, so its highest-value data product is the legal gap analysis, followed by a business register that records owner sex.
How the index is built
Each dimension is the simple mean of its indicators. GEVI is the weighted geometric mean of the five dimension scores.
| Dimension | Score D | Weight w | D^w |
|---|---|---|---|
| D1 Labour participation | 0.645 | 0.25 | 0.8963 |
| D2 Job quality and seniority | 0.894 | 0.20 | 0.9779 |
| D3 Enterprise and legal rights | 0.417 | 0.20 | 0.8396 |
| D4 Institutional visibility | 0.322 | 0.15 | 0.8437 |
| D5 Statistical and political voice | 0.412 | 0.20 | 0.8375 |
= 52.0
Product of the five terms = 0.5200, so GEVI = 100 × 0.5200 = 52.0, rank 5 of 15. Dimension values and the index are rounded as reported in the source.
Uncertainty and rank sensitivity
The 10,000-draw simulation samples each score with the standard deviation of its grade (13 grade A at 0.02) and draws dimension weights from a Dirichlet distribution centred on the base weights. Median 51.9, 5th to 95th percentile 47.7 to 56.5; blind-spot ratio 0/13 = 0.00. Under 5,000 random weight sets alone, the rank has a median of 6 with a range of 5 to 10.
Where the gap is
Each dimension is raised to full parity while holding the others fixed.
| Dimension raised to 1.0 | GEVI | Gain |
|---|---|---|
| D1 | 58.0 | +6.0 |
| D2 | 53.2 | +1.2 |
| D3 | 61.9 | +9.9 |
| D4 | 61.6 | +9.6 |
| D5 | 62.1 | +10.1 |
Single-indicator scenarios
Each scenario lifts one indicator to the upper quartile of countries with data.
| Indicator lifted | From | To | GEVI | Gain |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| I12 Women MPs | 0.074 | 0.382 | 55.4 | +3.4 |
| I7 Firm ownership | 0.624 | 0.986 | 54.7 | +2.7 |
| I3 Youth unemployment | 0.381 | 0.802 | 54.6 | +2.6 |
| I1 Labour force participation | 0.717 | 0.911 | 53.3 | +1.3 |
Values and gains are reproduced as printed in the paper; rounding can cause differences between displayed gains and subtraction of displayed index values. These conditional scenarios are not forecasts or causal estimates.
Reading the result
Enterprise and legal rights (D3 = 0.417) is the lowest in the series, and it is the dimension that drags the index. All three of its indicators are weak: 31.2% of firms have a woman among their owners, the law gives women 39.8% of the rights men have, and experts judge those rights enforced at 23% of their potential. Raising the legal score I8 from 0.398 to 0.60 would add 1.6 points, to 53.6; raising women's share of parliament from 3.7% to 15% would add 2.6 points, to 54.6.
Youth unemployment is a second signal: 9.66% for young women against 3.68% for young men, a ratio of 2.6 to 1.
The gaps are spread across D3, D4 and D5, so no single dimension carries the score; that is why the rank interval (5th to 10th) is wider than Fiji's or Samoa's.
Priorities and practical use
The priorities connect the index to actions and named users.
Legal reform first, because it has the lowest starting point. A gap analysis of the equal-pay, workplace-harassment and asset provisions against the WBL checklist would show which reforms move I8 most per amendment.
Build the enforcement record. The enforcement score (23%) can rise only if complaints and outcomes are recorded and published, which is a data system problem as much as a legal one.
Add sex to business and tax registrations. Owner sex on the business register would replace the survey-based I7 with a full-population measure.
Who uses the data, and for what decision?
| Data product | Primary user | Decision it informs | Cadence |
|---|---|---|---|
| I8 and I9 with a gap analysis against the WBL checklist | Law reform commission, attorney-general's office | Which statutory amendments to draft first; legal score is 39.8% and enforcement 23% | Legislative programme |
| I7 firm ownership by owner sex from the business register | Business registry, revenue authority | Replace a survey value (31.2%) with a full-population count and see whether women-owned firms use tax incentives at the same rate | Annual |
| I3 youth unemployment by sex (9.66% against 3.68%) | Labour ministry, statistics office | Whether the gap needs placement support or is a survey artefact of a small labour force | Each survey round |
| I12 and I11: women in parliament (3.7%) and cabinet (18.2%) | Parliament, women's organisations, donors | Evidence for candidate-support programmes; cabinet is 5 times parliament | After each election |
Tonga's binding constraint is legal and institutional, so its highest-value data product is the legal gap analysis, followed by a business register that records owner sex.
Series: GEVI Research Series · DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23205792